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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
 This appeal addresses the district court's denial of 
reinstatement in a case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The jury 
sustained appellant's constitutional claim, finding that 
appellees' decision not to reappoint appellant to a further 
annual term as township working roadmaster was predicated on 
appellant's exercise of his First Amendment rights; accordingly, 
the jury awarded damages to appellant.  But the district court, 
in the exercise of its equitable discretion, declined to direct 
that appellant be reinstated as working roadmaster.  On review of 
the reasons assigned by the district court for not ordering 
reinstatement, we conclude that those reasons do not adequately 
support the district court's decision not to provide make-whole 
relief.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand for entry of an order of reinstatement 
and for a new trial on compensatory damages. 
 
 I 
  
 Appellant Squires, appellee Bonser, and appellee 
Huffman constitute1 the membership of Middle Smithfield 
Township's board of township supervisors (hereinafter "the 
Board").  The three-member Board is responsible for "[t]he 
general supervision of the affairs of the township."  53 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 65510.2  Squires, a Republican, has served on 
the Board since January 1, 1984.  Bonser and Huffman, both 
Democrats, have served on the Board since, respectively, January 
1, 1976, and January 1, 1986.  
 Included among the Board's powers is that of appointing 
superintendents or roadmasters to work on and maintain the roads.  
Pennsylvania law expressly allows for a member of the Board to 
                     
1
.  In using the present tense, we characterize the case as it 
stood when the record and briefs on appeal were filed; the 
parties have not suggested, either at oral argument in this court 
or thereafter, that the posture of the case has undergone any 
significant change. 
2
.  Middle Smithfield Township is organized pursuant to the 
Second Class Township Code, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 65101 et. 
seq.  Section 65510 provides in full: 
 
  The general supervision of the affairs 
of the township shall be in the hands of 
three registered electors of the township, 
who shall be styled township supervisors, 
except that when upon referendum the election 
of two additional supervisors is provided 
for, the general supervision of the affairs 
of the township shall be in the hands of five 
registered electors of the township, who 
shall be styled township supervisors. 
 
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 65510 (Supp. 1994). 
  
serve as a superintendent or roadmaster.  See 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 65514.3 
 From 1984 through 1989, Squires held the position of 
part-time roadmaster.  In January, 1990, Squires was appointed by 
the Board at its annual reorganizational meeting to the full-time 
position of working roadmaster, a position in which Squires had 
responsibility for supervising the construction, maintenance, and 
                     
3
.  Section 65514 provides in part: 
 
  The board of township supervisors, 
immediately after their organization, shall 
divide the township into one or more road 
districts.  They shall employ a 
superintendent for the entire township or a 
roadmaster for each district. . . .  The 
supervisors shall fix the wages to be paid . 
. . to the superintendent or roadmasters and 
laborers for work on the roads and bridges, 
which wages shall not exceed wages paid in 
the locality for similar services. 
 
  This section shall not prohibit the 
township supervisors from being employed as 
superintendents or roadmasters, or as 
laborers, if physically able to work on and 
maintain the roads.  With regards to boards 
of supervisors which are designated as three-
member boards, any supervisor who is to be 
considered by such a board for position as a 
compensated employee of the township, as 
authorized by this section, shall not be 
excluded from voting on the issue of such 
appointment; such action shall be deemed to 
be within the scope of authority as a 
supervisor and shall not be deemed to 
constitute an illegal or an improper conflict 
of interest. 
 
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 65514 (Supp. 1994).   
  
repair of the Township's roads.  Squires' appointment as working 
roadmaster had the support of both Bonser and Huffman.  Squires 
was reappointed to the position in January 1991, again with the 
support of Bonser and Huffman.  In January 1992, Squires was not 
reappointed and Bonser became the working roadmaster.  
 On July 2, 1992, Squires instituted this § 1983 action 
against Bonser, Huffman, and the Middle Smithfield Township, 
contending that his non-reappointment to the position of working 
roadmaster constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights.  
Specifically, Squires undertook to show at trial that the non-
reappointment occurred in retaliation for: (1) comments made by 
Squires to Huffman in 1991 in which Squires defended his son's 
candidacy for a position on the Board;4 and (2) criticism by 
Squires in 1988, 1989, and 1991 of Huffman's participation in 
certain township matters  in particular, Squires' allegations 
that Huffman, an electrical contractor, had a conflict of 
interest in performing contracting work for several developers 
who had matters pending before the Board.   
 On April 27, 1993, the jury returned a verdict for 
Squires, awarding him $37,100 in compensatory damages and $1,500 
in punitive damages.  On May 7, 1993, Squires filed a motion with 
the district court for reinstatement to the position of working 
                     
4
.  Squires' son ran against Huffman in the November 1991 
election for a position on the Board.  Huffman won the election.  
2 App. at 291. 
  
roadmaster.  The motion for reinstatement was denied on December 
14, 1993.  Squires has appealed. 
 
 II 
 A 
 Reinstatement is an equitable remedy available in 
unconstitutional discharge cases arising under § 1983.  Versarge 
v. Township of Clinton, New Jersey, 984 F.2d 1359, 1368 (3d Cir. 
1993).5  The decision whether to award reinstatement thus lies 
within the discretion of the district court.   
 In reviewing an order denying reinstatement, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the district court.  We do, 
however, have an obligation to examine whether the equitable 
factors considered by the district court and the weight given to 
those factors are appropriate in light of the purposes underlying 
                     
5
.  Section 1983, authorizing both legal and equitable relief, 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
 Every person who, under color of statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).  
  
the statutory cause of action.  As we stated in Gurmankin v. 
Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
923 (1981): 
 Meaningful appellate review of the exercise 
of discretion requires consideration of the 
basis on which the trial court acted.  If the 
factors considered do not accord with those 
required by the policy underlying the 
substantive right or if the weight given to 
those factors is not consistent with that 
necessary to effectuate that policy, then the 
reviewing tribunal has an obligation to 
require the exercise of discretion in 
accordance with "what is right and equitable 
under the circumstances and the law." 
 
Id. at 1119-1120 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 
(1931)).  See also Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 417 (1975) ("[W]hen Congress invokes the Chancellor's 
conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is 
required is the principled application of standards consistent 
with those purposes . . . ."). 
 In the context of discriminatory discharge actions 
arising under Title VII, it is well established that the district 
court's consideration of equitable remedies is to be guided by 
the statute's central goals of make-whole relief and deterrence. 
Id. at 417-22.  Thus, the denial of a make-whole remedy must be 
supported by "reasons which, if applied generally, would not 
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating 
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole 
for injuries suffered through past discrimination."  Id. at 421 
  
(addressing denial of backpay).  See Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976) (addressing denial of seniority 
relief) (quoting Albemarle Paper).6  This court has previously 
recognized, for example, that denial of reinstatement may be 
appropriate in a Title VII action where "animosity between the 
parties makes such a remedy impracticable."  Ellis v. Ringgold 
School Dist., 832 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 This action arises under § 1983, whose "purpose . . . 
is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority 
to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and 
to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails."  Wyatt v. 
Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1992).  In 1871, in fashioning 
§ 1983  as, in 1991, it was to do in revising (with a view to 
strengthening) Title VII  Congress authorized courts to deploy 
both legal and equitable remedies.  Under Title VII, the 
statute's make-whole purpose "is shown by the very fact that 
Congress took care to arm the courts with full equitable powers."  
Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418.  The same is true under § 1983: 
the make-whole goal "[does] not differ when the basis of the 
underlying right is the Constitution rather than a statute such 
                     
6
.  Moreover, a district court, when denying make-whole relief, 
is required to articulate its reasons for doing so.  See Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 774 ("[I]f the district court 
declines, due to the peculiar circumstances of the particular 
case, to award relief generally appropriate under Title VII, 
'[i]t is necessary . . . that . . . it carefully articulate its 
reasons' for so doing." (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 421 
n.14)). 
  
as Title VII."  Gurmankin, 626 F.2d at 1121.7  Because of this 
consonance of the underlying policy considerations, the framework 
of analysis governing reinstatement in Title VII actions also 
governs in § 1983 actions implicating First Amendment concerns; 
that is, a denial of reinstatement is unwarranted unless grounded 
in a rationale which is harmonious with the legislative goals of 
providing plaintiffs make-whole relief and deterring employers 
from unconstitutional conduct.  Cf. Gurmankin, 626 F.2d at 1121 
(section 1983 cases involving "discrimination in employment based 
on stereotyped notions of ability . . . require[] equitable 
remedies comparable to those deemed appropriate in Title VII 
employment discrimination cases"). 
 We appreciate that there may not be absolute congruence 
between the equitable remedies long accepted under Title VII and 
those conventional under § 1983, for the reason that, prior to 
the revision of Title VII in 1991, the remedies available under 
Title VII were entirely equitable, whereas § 1983 has always 
provided both legal and equitable relief.  Given the pre-1991 
disparity between the two statutes' remedial arsenals, it has 
                     
7
.  We have similarly recognized the make-whole purpose governing 
remedies for employment discrimination cases arising under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq.  See Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d 
Cir. 1985) ("The inclusion of equitable relief strengthens the 
conclusion that Congress intended victims of age discrimination 
to be made whole by restoring them to the position they would 
have been in had the discrimination never occurred."), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
  
been argued that the presumption in favor of reinstatement 
developed under pre-1991 Title VII case law should not be 
directly transferred to actions arising under § 1983.  See 
Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321-22 (1st Cir. 
1989) (en banc) ("The fewer the available methods of redress, the 
more likely that 'sound legal principles' will counsel in favor 
of reinstatement as the relief of choice.").   
 We do not find it fruitful to explore how the 
"presumption" or "preference" in favor of reinstatement in the 
Title VII context compares in kind or degree with that applicable 
to reinstatement under § 1983.  Suffice it to say that, while the 
availability of legal relief under § 1983  and now under Title 
VII  may influence the use of equitable remedies under these 
provisions, the central goals of make-whole relief and deterrence 
must guide a district court's consideration of reinstatement 
under both.  Reinstatement advances the policy goals of make-
whole relief and deterrence in a way which money damages cannot.  
As stated by the Eleventh Circuit in Allen v. Autauga County 
Board of Education, 685 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982): 
 When a person loses his job, it is at best 
disingenuous to say that money damages can 
suffice to make that person whole.  The 
psychological benefits of work are 
intangible, yet they are real and cannot be 
ignored. . . . We also note that 
reinstatement is an effective deterrent in 
preventing employer retaliation against 
employees who exercise their constitutional 
rights.  If an employer's best efforts to 
remove an employee for unconstitutional 
reasons are presumptively unlikely to 
  
succeed, there is, of course, less incentive 
to use employment decisions to chill the 
exercise of constitutional rights. 
See also Banks v. Burkich, 788 F.2d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1986) 
("The prospect of money damages will not be sufficient for many 
employees to overcome the otherwise chilling effect that 
accompanies the threat of termination.").  Thus, while the 
availability of money damages may have significance in the 
district court's consideration of remedies, reinstatement is the 
preferred remedy in the absence of special circumstances 
militating against it.  See Feldman v. Philadelphia Housing 
Authority, 43 F.3d 823, 831 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The equitable remedy 
of reinstatement is available for discharges that violate 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and reinstatement is the preferred remedy to cover 
the loss of future earnings." (citations omitted)); id. at 835 
(Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is 
well settled that reinstatement is the preferred remedy to avoid 
future lost earnings.").8  In sum, we think the First Circuit had 
it right in its well-reasoned en banc opinion in Rosario-Torres:  
                     
8
.   Cf. Robinson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow, 982 F.2d 
892, 899 (3d Cir. 1993) (Title VII) ("[R]einstatement is the 
preferred remedy to avoid future lost earnings . . . ."); Ellis, 
832 F.2d at 30 (Title VII) ("Reinstatement is the preferred 
remedy to avoid future lost earnings."); Blum v. Witco Chemical 
Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Back pay coupled with 
reinstatement is the preferred remedy to avoid future damages in 
ADEA cases."); Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796 (ADEA) ("Reinstatement 
is the preferred remedy to avoid future lost earnings, but 
reinstatement may not be feasible in all cases."). 
  
 Whenever an ex-employee sues alleging 
wrongful dismissal by a government agency, 
job restoration may be a material aspect of 
meaningful relief.  Yet in the real world, 
reinstatement in unlawful-discharge cases 
often will place some burden on the agency: 
there will likely be tension (or even 
hostility) between the parties when forcibly 
reunited; employees who have assumed duties 
previously performed by the fired worker will 
have to be displaced when he or she returns; 
and, as a result, the public's business may 
be conducted somewhat less efficaciously.  Be 
that as it may, we agree with those courts 
which have ruled that such routinely 
"incidental" burdens, in their accustomed 
manifestations, are foreseeable sequelae of 
defendant's wrongdoing, and usually 
insufficient, without more, to tip the scales 
against reinstatement when first amendment 
rights are at stake in a section 1983 action.  
  We do not perceive such a positioning of 
the weighbeam as a departure from general 
equitable principles.  It is, rather, merely 
a way of setting a starting-point for the 
district court's consideration.  Once this is 
understood, the "presumption" of 
reinstatement becomes just the dress of 
thought, a shorthand manner of saying that 
equitable considerations different in kind or 
degree from those regularly accompanying 
reinstatement must be present if 
reinstatement is to be withheld from the 
victim of a first amendment infraction. 
 
889 F.2d at 322-23 (citations omitted).  Cf. Professional Ass'n 
of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College Dist., 
730 F.2d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he court should deny 
reinstatement in a first amendment wrongful discharge case on the 
basis of equity only in exceptional circumstances."), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); Banks, 788 F.2d at 1165 (reversing 
  
district court's denial of reinstatement in a § 1983 action where 
record did "not . . . establish this as one of those 'exceptional 
cases in which reinstatement is inappropriate'" (quoting Allen, 
685 F.2d at 1306)).9 
 With these principles in mind, we turn to examine the 
factors relied upon by the district court to support its denial 
of Squires' motion for reinstatement. 
 
 B 
 The district court found that the following 
circumstances supported a denial of reinstatement: (1) "the 
evidence at trial did not overwhelmingly support Squires' claim 
of constitutional deprivation"; (2) "[t]here were incidents of 
poor performance by plaintiff"; (3)  plaintiff "would still be 
required to work at the side of the defendants"; (4) 
"[r]einstatement would create a delicate balance which could 
jeopardize required township business which remains the 
responsibility of the supervisors who, in Pennsylvania, uniquely 
serve as the executive as well as the legislative branches of 
government"; (5) this was not "a case where plaintiff has been 
unable to secure employment"; and (6) reinstatement would "not 
                     
9
.  Moreover, in § 1983 unconstitutional discharge cases, as in 
Title VII cases, the district court is required to articulate its 
reasons when denying reinstatement.  See supra n.6. 
  
result in the restoration of seniority or pension benefits."  
Squires v. Bonser, et al., No. 92-908  (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1993). 
 We find that these factors, as developed on the record 
before us, do not present special circumstances which justify the 
denial of reinstatement: 
 The first factor  the district court's assessment 
that the evidence "did not overwhelmingly support Squires' claim 
of constitutional deprivation"  is an impermissible factor for 
the district court to consider.  Once the jury has found in favor 
of plaintiff on liability, the existence of a constitutional 
deprivation is an established fact which may not be re-examined 
in the district court's subsequent determinations  including 
determinations of appropriate equitable remedies.  See United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Century 
Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'[I]n 
deciding whether to grant equitable relief under Title VII, the 
district court [is] prohibited from reconsidering any issues 
necessarily and actually decided by the jury.'" (quoting Hussein 
v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir. 1987)));  
cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n. 11 (1974) (where a 
case encompasses claims for both legal and injunctive relief, 
"the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all issues 
common to both claims, remains intact"); Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, 852 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1988) (the "preeminence of jury 
verdicts" requires that "the jury's findings on a § 1981 claim . 
  
. . [bind] the trial judge's resolution of a concurrently tried 
Title VII claim" on issues common to both claims).  For the 
district court to accord weight to its view that the evidence 
supporting the jury's finding was not "overwhelming" would 
impermissibly interfere with the province of the jury.10 
 The second factor mentioned by the district court was 
"incidents of poor performance by plaintiff."   Under the Mount 
Healthy framework applicable to First Amendment unconstitutional 
discharge cases arising under § 1983, a finding of liability 
against the employer requires the inference that, absent the 
unconstitutional conduct, the adverse employment action would not 
have occurred.11  Denying reinstatement merely upon a showing of 
                     
10
.  We note that the jury found the evidence sufficiently strong 
so as to justify a punitive damages award of $1500.  2 App. at 
667.  In awarding punitive damages, the jury evidently found, in 
accordance with the district court's instruction on punitive 
damages, that the defendants had acted "with malicious intent to 
violate the plaintiff's Federal rights, or unlawfully to injure 
him, [or] . . . with a callous or reckless disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights." Id. at 653-54. 
11
.  The distribution of the burden of proof in First Amendment 
unconstitutional discharge actions was established by the Supreme 
Court in Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977).  Under the Mount Healthy framework, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of showing that "his conduct was constitutionally 
protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial factor' or, 
to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in 
the [defendant's] decision not to rehire him."  Mount Healthy, 
429 U.S. at 287.  If plaintiff carries that burden, the employer 
bears the burden of showing "by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision as to [plaintiff's] 
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct."  Id.  
Cf. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Education, 913 F.2d 1064, 1074-
75 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Mount Healthy framework).  
  
(..continued) 
     Given this distribution of the burden of proof, a liability 
verdict for plaintiff requires the inference that the employer's 
decision would not have been reached in the absence of the 
protected conduct.  As discussed in Price Waterhouse  in which 
the Supreme Court applied the Mount Healthy framework to "mixed-
motives" cases arising under Title VII  "[a] court that finds 
for a plaintiff under [the Mount Healthy] standard has 
effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive was a 'but-for' 
cause of the employment decision."  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) (plurality opinion).  See also id. at 
277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the "evidentiary scheme [adopted 
in Price Waterhouse] essentially requires the employer to place 
the employee in the same position he or she would have occupied 
absent discrimination" (citing Mount Healthy in comparison)). 
     The jury instructions provided by the district judge, while 
generally following Mount Healthy, seem to have been somewhat 
imprecise as to the relative burdens of proof.  The district 
judge first stated that plaintiff had the burden of proving that 
his speech activities were "a substantial factor or motivating 
factor" in the decision not to reappoint him as roadmaster.  2 
App. at 648.  The district judge then stated that if plaintiff 
carried its burden, defendants had the burden of showing "by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff would have been 
dismissed or not reappointed in any event."  Id. at 650.  
Finally, the district judge said: 
 
 If the defense meets its burden of proof that 
plaintiff would have been dismissed or not 
reappointed in any event, plaintiff must 
satisfy you by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the reasons offered by the 
defense were simply a pretext.  And that, 
indeed, motivation to rid him because of his 
speech was still a substantial factor in the 
actions of each defendant. 
 
Id. at 651.  This final instruction may be seen as introducing 
ambiguity into the Mount Healthy formulation: i.e., this 
instruction may be read as meaning that a verdict could be 
returned in favor of the plaintiff even if the defendants had 
proved that they would not have reappointed plaintiff in any 
case.  Appellees have not, however, placed this aspect of the 
case in focus on appeal.  Consequently, appellees are bound to 
the results which normally flow from a finding of liability under 
the Mount Healthy framework. 
  
run-of-the-mill incidents of sub-par performance would 
substantially undercut the goal of providing make-whole relief.  
Thus, we do not find that such a showing constitutes a special 
circumstance militating against reinstatement.12  
 The third and fourth factors identified by the district 
court  that plaintiff "would still be required to work at the 
side of the defendants" and that "[r]einstatement would create a 
delicate balance which could jeopardize required township 
business"  are also not buttressed by findings sufficient to 
make them permissible considerations.  In order to deny 
reinstatement, more than the ordinary tensions accompanying an 
unconstitutional discharge lawsuit must be present.  "The fact 
that reinstatement might have 'disturbing consequences,' 'revive 
old antagonisms,' or 'breed difficult working conditions' usually 
is not enough 'to outweigh the important first amendment policies 
that reinstatement serves [absent] probable adverse consequences 
                     
12
.  Denial of reinstatement may be appropriate in cases 
involving employee misconduct of a particularly egregious kind, 
but in the case at bar the district court has made no findings of 
this sort.  See Professional Ass'n of College Educators, 730 F.2d 
at 268 (harassment of president of the college through anonymous 
telephone calls may justify decision not to reinstate former 
dean).  Reinstatement may also be denied where after-acquired 
evidence establishes "wrongdoing . . . of such severity that the 
employee would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the 
employer had known of it at the time of the discharge."  McKennon 
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 
(1995).  It has not been found by the district court or contended 
here that this case falls under the after-acquired evidence 
rubric. 
  
[that] weigh so heavily that they counsel the court against 
imposing this preferred remedy.'"  Banks, 788 F.2d at 1165 
(quoting Professional Ass'n of College Educators, 730 F.2d at 
269); cf. Blum, 829 F.2d at 373-74 (ADEA) ("Unfortunately, 
reinstatement is not always feasible, e.g., because of 
irreparable animosity between the parties . . . ."); McKnight v. 
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 116 (7th Cir. 1990) (Title 
VII) ("Mere hostility by the employer or its supervisory 
employees is of course no ground for denying reinstatement . . .  
That would arm the employer to defeat the court's remedial 
order."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).  Since the district 
court made no finding that tensions between the parties exceeded 
those which normally accompany such actions  and, indeed, 
expressly recited that it did "not . . . conclude that such 
animosity is irreparable"  these considerations do not justify 
a denial of reinstatement.13 
 Finally, the fifth and sixth factors identified by the 
district court  that this was not "a case where plaintiff has 
been unable to secure employment," inasmuch as "[a]t all times he 
had his own contracting business, and after his termination, he 
was employed full time at an ACME market"; and that 
                     
13
.  As of the time the briefs on appeal were filed, it appeared 
that Squires was still a member of the Board and Bonser was 
working roadmaster, see supra n.1., which would seem to mean that 
a "delicate balance" would exist whether or not Squires were to 
replace Bonser as working roadmaster. 
  
"[r]einstatement will not result in the restoration of seniority 
or pension benefits"  do not present special circumstances that 
cut against reinstatement.  While these factors indicate that 
front-pay may come closer to providing make-whole relief than it 
otherwise might, they do not negate the additional psychological 
and deterrent benefits which reinstatement provides.  Cf. Allen, 
685 F.2d at 1306.  Moreover, in considering that, after losing 
his township position, the plaintiff was able to find alternative 
employment, the district court failed to give adequate 
consideration to the comparability of that new employment.  We do 
not believe that the fact that Squires was able to get a job in 
the produce section at an ACME market militates against granting 
him reinstatement as the township's working roadmaster. 
 In sum, we conclude that denial of reinstatement for 
the reasons assigned by the district court was not a proper 
exercise of that court's equitable discretion.14 
                     
14
.  Appellees cite an additional factor, not discussed by the 
district court, in support of denying reinstatement.  Appellees 
argue that it would be inappropriate for Squires to be reinstated 
because the position of working roadmaster is a one-year 
appointment.  Since the decision challenged by Squires was the 
non-reappointment of Squires in 1992, appellees contend that an 
order for reinstatement at this time would "interfere with the 
statutory scheme for appointing roadmasters."  Appellees' Br. at 
21.  We agree that ordering reinstatement does, in some measure, 
intrude upon the statutory scheme.  But the jury, through its 
verdict in Squires' favor, has determined that defendants have 
skewed the statutory scheme by infringing upon Squires' First 
Amendment rights.  Reinstatement comes into play as a make-whole 
remedy vindicating those rights and thereby restoring the 
constitutional integrity of the statutory scheme. 
  
 
 
 
 III 
 Appellees have offered a further reason why 
reinstatement was properly denied.  Appellees contend that, 
because reinstatement and front-pay are alternative forms of 
relief, and because Squires was awarded front-pay damages by the 
jury, relief in the form of reinstatement is barred.   
 We disagree.  It is true that if front-pay was awarded, 
a grant of reinstatement would raise concerns regarding double 
recovery.  Such concerns could be alleviated by an order vacating 
any front-pay award; however, it may not be possible in this case 
to isolate the front-pay award since the jury awarded a lump-sum 
amount for compensatory damages.15  But this does not foreclose 
reinstatement; rather, it means that the issue of double recovery 
should be resolved by a new trial on compensatory damages.  Cf. 
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(remanding for a new trial on compensatory damages where there 
may have been overlap between backpay award determined by the 
                     
15
.  Question Three of the verdict form, to which the jury 
responded with the lump-sum award of $37,100, read: "What 
compensatory damages, if any, did the plaintiff suffer?"  2 App. 
at 667. In instructing the jury regarding the components of the 
damages award, the district judge stated that "[p]laintiff is 
entitled to be compensated for any wages that you find that he 
lost up to this date, or any wages that you find that he may lose 
in the future." Id. at 651.   
  
district judge and compensatory damages award determined by the 
jury); Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 278-79 (8th Cir. 
1978) (remanding for redetermination of monetary award where 
there may have been overlap between backpay award and 
compensatory damages award).  Therefore, the fact that the jury 
was instructed on front-pay does not preclude a judicial 
determination that equitable relief in the form of reinstatement 
is called for.16  
 
 IV 
 In sum, the factors enumerated by the district court do 
not present special circumstances justifying the denial of 
reinstatement.  Further, reinstatement is not precluded by the 
fact that the jury may have included front-pay in its damages 
award.  Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's order 
denying reinstatement and remand the case for entry of an order 
of reinstatement and for a new trial on compensatory damages.  
                     
16
.  However, we discourage the practice of asking the jury for a 
lump-sum award which includes front-pay when the plaintiff also 
seeks reinstatement.  Such a procedure wastes judicial resources 
in that if reinstatement is awarded a retrial is then required to 
parcel out the damages into component parts (i.e., front-pay 
versus back-pay).  Accordingly, we believe the preferable course 
for a plaintiff seeking the equitable remedy of reinstatement is 
for such a plaintiff to ask for a jury interrogatory concerning 
the amount of damages attributable to front-pay in order to avoid 
a double recovery.  In the future, we may require such a practice 
in order to preserve a claim for reinstatement. 
  
   
